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The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the implications of the 
development of Irish hydrocarbon resources by international oil 
companies. A number of introductory observations, however, are 
necessary in order to set this examination in context. 
Hydrocarbons, of which the most economically important are oil and 
natural gas, are formed by the crushing of organic material under 
masses of sediment carried onto continental shelves or inland seas by 
rivers emanating from adjoining landmasses. We can infer, therefore, 
that hydrocarbons will be found to some degree in any part of the 
world where accumulations of sediment are present. Many such 
accumulations now form dry land, it should be noted, due to move 
ments in the earth's crust. The distribution of oil and gas production is 
a function principally of the degree of accumulation of oil/gas into 
pools or reservoirs, the size of these reservoirs, and the cost of 
extraction. Cost here includes local taxation levels, risk factors, and 
transport costs, as well as direct extraction costs. Offshore extraction 
costs are of course much greater than those on dry land, so that off 
shore production on a wide scale was not feasible until the major price 
increases of 1973. 
WORLD OIL/GAS INDUSTRY 
Broadly speaking, it can be said that the geography of oil/gas 
production holds massive connotations for world economics and 
politics in that, with the ex300tion of the Soviet Union and China, and 
to a lesser extent the United States, the major areas of world petroleum 
consumption are geographically separated from the major areas of 
production. One immediate result of this is that nearly two-thirds of all 
international trade, by volume, consists of shipments of petroleum. 
Thus Western Europe, representing over one quarter of total oil 
demand, is, with the ex300tion of Britain and Norway, dependent on 
imports for over 95 per cent of its supplies. Japan, accounting for 
nearly 10 per cent of demand, is totally dependent on oil imports. The 
United States consumes 30 per cent of the world's oil, and imports 
nearly one-third of its requirements.' The introduction of Alaskan oil, 
plus increased domestic production, should give the U.S. near self 
sufficiency in the near future. In fact, it has been suggested that the 
major U.S. oil companies were active instigators of the 1973 price rises, 
in that these enhanced greatly the profitability of their high-cost 
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domestic fields.' North Sea oil will give Europe relief in the medium 
term  say, up to the 1990s  but even here political problems of a 
smaller scale are presented by the fact that Britain and Norway have a 
virtual 600opoly of the supply. All the other Western Europe countries 
are now beginning to explore their offshore areas, but there will be 
little consolation for West Germany, which has a particularly small off 
shore area. The immediate position of Japan is quite bleak, although 
there may be possibilities of future finds in its adjacent seabed. Mean 
while, the smug self-sufficiency of the major socialist powers is giving 
many Western observers great cause for concern. 
In the long term, the present political and economic implications of 
the world geography of oil demand and supply seem likely to remain. 
OPEC (the Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries still 
possesses two-thirds of the world's known oil reserves (compared with 
less than 11 per cent for the developed capitalist countries, 15.5 per 
cent for the socialist countries, and 9.3 per cent for the rest). More 
important, of the total additions to reserves in the period 1960-1975, 
two-thirds occurred in the OPEC countries, and over one-fifth in the 
socialist countries. The Western Countries, representing over 70 per 
cent of total consumption, contributed less than 10 per cent to known 
reserves in the last fifteen years.3 
The great economic, and hence political, significance of this situation 
derives from the crucial role played by energy in an advanced economy. 
This role has now achieved such significance that it has been suggested 
that energy should be added to the traditional list of factors of produc 
tion (land, labour, and capital). The contribution of oil and gas to total 
energy supply is immense: in 1980 oil supplied 44.5 per cent and gas 
18 per cent (compare: coal 28.5 per cent, other 9 per cent).' The leading 
position of oil/gas as energy sources is a very recent occurrence. In me 
period 1955-1965 their share of total energy consumption in West 
Europe rose from eighteen to forty-five per cent; for Japan, the respec 
tive figures are 18 per cent and 57 per cent.' This rapid change was due 
to the price war which broke out in the oil industry in the mid-fifties 
driving oil prices down to rockbottom levels (and consequentially 
bringing OPEC into existence)." Despite recent dramatic increases in oil 
prices, the structure of energy supply is unlikely to change significantly 
in the medium-term future. One forecast has it that by 1990 oil will 
still contribute 40 per cent of supply; gas will have increased its share to 
21 per cent; coal will drop to 21 per cent and hydro-power to 5 per 
cent; nuclear power will stand at 11 per cent; and various new sources 
(tar sands, oil shales, geothermal and solar energy will provide maybe 
2 per cent.' 
THE INTERNATIONAL MAJORS 
It seems then that, for the foreseeable future, oil and gas will dominate 
the world's vital energy supply. it is in this light that we may introduce 
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the added dimension of the international oil companies. The 
importance of these may be gauged from the fact that the petroleum 
industry accounts for nearly 30 per cent of all foreign direct invest 
ment, with the proportion varying from 25 per cent in developed 
countries to 40 per cent in less-developed countries (including OPEC). 
More significantly, petroleum earnings represented nearly 40 per cent 
of all earnings from foreign direct investment in the late sixties, with 
the figure rising to nearly 60 per cent in the case of investments in the 
less-developed countries.8 
We will devote our attention in particular to the seven international 
'majors', which up to recently controlled 80 per cent of all oil produc 
tion outside the U.S. and the socialist countries.' Despite wholesale 
nationalizations of oil production by OPEC governments, the 'majors' 
still maintain a powerful position as regards refining and distribution. 
Their collective strength, therefore, both economic and strategic, is 
immense. Total assets of the five U.S. 'majors' in 1973 amounted to 
one-eighth of the combined assets of the top five hundred U.S. 
manufacturing companies; total profits amounted to one-sixth of those 
of the top five hundred. All five appear in the U.S. top ten.1 Taken as 
a bloc, then, the majors comprise quite a considerable economic and 
political force. Nor is it unreasonable to regard them as constituting a 
single bloc. Ever since the establishment of the infamous 'oil cartel' in 
1934, the majors have succeeded in undertaking admirable concerted 
action on their own behalf.11 This was never more apparent than during 
the oil crisis of 1973 when, under cover of simultaneous OPEC price 
impositions, and with the aid of co-ordinated supply restrictions, the 
majors managed to increase their profits by an average of 78 per cent 
over the previous year, ranging from 45 per cent for Texaco to 271 per 
cent in the case of BP." We may in passing note the political connota 
tions of the fact that five of the seven 'majors', which control the vital 
oil supply to Western Europe and Japan, are American. 
THE CASE OF IRELAND 
At this stage we can introduce a discussion of Ireland's place in the 
world of oil and gas. Most of the island of Ireland is made of sedimen 
tary rocks, which may mean the presence of hydrocarbon reservoirs. In 
fact, onshore drilling has come across very slight gas 'shows'. However, 
much more promising are the sedimentary basins in the offshore areas 
under Irish jurisdiction, which are much larger in area than the island 
itself. Major reservoirs, if present at all, seem most likely to be found in 
deep water beyond the limits of present extraction technology, 
although at current rates of technological development this may not be 
long the case. Meanwhile, the areas of shallower water nearer the shore 
hold bright prospects for reservoirs which, though modest by inter 
national standards, could be quite significant in terms of the small Irish 
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economy. This question of the appropriate yardstick with which to 
judge the significance of Irish oil/gas reservoirs will form an important 
part of a later section of this paper. 
The presence of hydrocarbons off the Irish coast has, of course, been 
well established. The majority of wells drilled have revealed at least 
'shows' of oil and/or gas, and at least six of these have generated 
significant flows. One of the latter  the Kinsale gas field  was 
brought into production in 1978 with a rate of output equivalent, in 
energy terms, to about 14 per cent of national needs for a projected 
twenty-year lifespan. However, about 40 per cent of this output is 
being used, not for energy, but for the production of fertilizer at a new 
plant built by Nitrigin Eireann Teoranta in Cork Habour. The bulk of 
the remainder is being used to generate electricity at a plant built 
especially for this purpose, also in Cork Harbour. A recent reappraisal 
of the Kinsale gas field reserves has led to a 35 per cent increase in these 
reserves: the output level is to be increased to supply the gas pipeline 
to Dublin which is due for completion late in 1982, with the possibility 
of further extension to Northern Ireland thereafter. 
Mention of fertilizer production highlights another important aspect 
of the oil/gas industry, which is that its products can be used as the raw 
materials for a variety of manufacturing industries, such as plastics, 
synthetic fibres and pharmaceuticals (as well as fertilizers). The fact 
that over 90 per cent of all oil/gas produced is used as a fuel may yet be 
regarded by future generations as a highly wasteful use of a valuable 
raw material. 
Apart from the Kinsale gas field, British Petroleum is currently 
appraising an oil field in the Porcupine Basin off the west coast where 
two wells have already flowed oil, while a field in the same Basin 
probed by Phillips Petroleum in 1981 may also prove ultimately to be a 
commercial proposition. These fields lie in water depths beyond the 
range of current extraction technology, but appropriate techniques are 
expected to be available if and when a decision to develop is made. 
THE INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES AND IRELAND 
One of the most significant aspects of current exploration in Ireland's 
offshore areas is the level of interest shown by the 'major' oil 
companies. Five of these  Esso, Shell, BP, Chevron and Gulf  are 
principal operators (in the case of Esso, sole operator in consortia 
which have received exploration licences. The remaining two  Texaco 
and Mobil  have been involved in exploration in the past but have 
discontinued this involvement. In addition, several members of the 
'second tier' of international oil companies  Amoco, Marathon, 
Phillips, Elf  are also deeply involved in exploration in Irish waters. 
The fact that so many of the most successful oil companies in the 
business are engaged in exploration here engenders firm optimism 
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concerning the prospects of finding significant quantities of oil/gas. 
At the same time, it can be contended that the presence of the 
international oil companies introduces several problematic considera 
tions as regards securing the maximum economic benefit for the 
national economy from the development of the country's prospective 
offshore hydrocarbon resources. We may, for a moment, consider just 
what this 'maximum benefit' might be. As indicated earlier, the Irish 
economy is small relative to our potential offshore resources. One 
moderate oilfield producing 120,000 barrels per day would suffice to 
meet our current total energy needs. A reasonably successful explora 
tion effort, therefore, could make Ireland a substantial surplus producer. 
This raises the question of the manner of disposal of this surplus. The 
main alternatives would seem to be to sell it, in either crude or refined 
form, to a ready market in Western Europe, or to keep it at home as the 
raw material for a petrochemical industry, which could in turn generate 
downstream manufacturing industries producing products of the kinds 
mentioned earlier, such as plastics and synthetic textiles. There seems 
little doubt that, in terms of value added and jobs created, the latter 
course is by far the more preferable alternative. It is in this context that 
we may discuss some of the problems which may arise due to the 
development of our offshore resources by international oil companies. 
International corporations, by definition, operate in a global arena. 
The 'major' oil companies are particularly international, in that their 
operations are carried on in virtually every country in the world. The 
policy followed by each local operation is designed in terms of its 
contribution to the over-all profitability of the company. It does not 
necessarily follow that, if each local operation pursues an independent 
profit-maximization policy, maximum over-all company profit will 
ensue. One writer has used the term 'international synergy' to describe 
this situation, where over-all operations are made more profitable than 
if each component were operating independently. 13 
Thus, the development of any Irish fields will be subject to global 
company policy in the first instance, and there is no guarantee that 
such policy will coincide with the best interests of the Irish economy. 
Take, for example, the case of an oilfield which, because of small size 
or extraction difficulties, is of marginal or relatively low profitability. 
At any given time the international oil companies are likely to have 
before them an array of prospective fields scattered throughout the 
globe, and given that, despite the size of the companies concerned, 
financial and organizational resources are not in infinite supply, it 
follows that the least-appealing prospects may have to remain 
undeveloped. Some prospects may in fact find themselves in this 
position indefinitely, given that new finds are being made continuously. 
A.I. Levorsen, author of an important textbook on petroleum geology, 
has commented on this as follows: 
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Discounting of a potentially small pool is especially frequent a600g larger oil 
companies, whose crude oil requirements run into many millions of barrels 
per year, and whose operating expenses are proportionately large. They are 
not much interested unless the prospect has some chance of being a substan 
tial help in their supply problems. 14 
There may be considerations other than financial or organizational 
which could lead to moratoria on the development of small Irish fields, 
including such things as future price and supply projections, or strategic 
distribution of global supply sources. Nevertheless, the ultimate effect 
may be that fields which, for strategic or purely economic reasons  
again, bearing in mind the small size of the Irish economy  might be 
worthwhile propositions, might remain undeveloped by a big oil 
company. It should be borne in mind that, at least in the near future, 
any oil or gas fields located in Irish waters are likely to be of small 
size. 15 
The potential problems raised in the previous paragraph have 
recently been alluded to in newspaper coverage of the Irish offshore 
scene. Donal Musgrave, writing in the Sunday Tribune (October 18, 
1981), agreed that any assumption that oil fields will be developed once 
they are deemed commercial is unrealistic. Thus, for example, he 
suggested that because the Phillips Company is currently concentrating 
its resources on North Sea development work, its 1981 Porcupine oil 
find, even if commercial, might have to wait several years before the 
company could devote due attention to it. He goes on: 
This means that the London based engineering and design teams who would 
put a Porcupine development package together will be tied up for the next 
few years on North Sea work. This is their top priority right now and any 
Porcupine discovery will have to take its place in the queue (p. 3). 
Similarly, Des Crowley, also writing in the Sunday Tribune (October 
25, 1981), in discussing the development prospects of BP'S Porcupine 
field, suggests that "BP... has other possibly more lucrative irons in the 
fire outside Ireland and does not have massive funds to 'waste' on 
small developments" (p. 10). 
Further problems arise in cases where tielcts are being developed by 
international oil companies. Again, they will wish to dispose of the 
product in terms of global policy, which may not coincide with 
Ireland's best interests. For example, we have already noted that over 
90 per cent of the world's oil/gas is being used as a fuel, which means 
that the oil companies have a heavy commitment to this manner of oil 
gas disposal. The location of oil/gas resources in Irish waters will no 
doubt be seen by other West European countries as a source of relief 
from dependence on imports from OPEC countries. This has already 
been indicated by the participation of several European oil companies, 
including some State-owned concerns, in oil exploration licences issued 
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by the Irish government. Given the extent of the international oil 
companies' stake in these European countries compared with their 
stake in Ireland, one can appreciate whose interests are likely to gain 
priority when it comes to deciding the manner of disposal of Irish oil 
gas. If oil/gas is discovered by consortia with European participation, 
the European dimension is obviously going to be even more emphasized. 
It has already been argued that the best interests of the Irish economy 
would be served by the use of our potential oil/gas resources as the 
basis for home-based manufacturing industries. It can be seen that there 
are many considerations operating against these interests under present 
policy for the development of these resources. 
A second factor likely to influence strongly the international oil 
companies where they are exploiting Irish fields is the need to 
maximize profits, if not in the short term at least in the medium term. 
Hence rates of extraction may be adopted which may not coincide with 
the national interest. Rapid extraction seems all the more likely given 
pressures arising from the demand side, for reasons referred to in the 
previous paragraph. Were Ireland's oil/gas resources to be directed to 
Irish processing industries, it seems that extraction rates should be 
geared to the pace of development of these industries. And given the 
small size of the economy relative to the potential extent of offshore 
resources, it seems desirable that Ireland should keep extraction at a 
relatively low level, in order to maximize the longevity of these 
resources. Even in a situation where oil was being exported, rapid 
extraction could cause severe inflationary and other dislocations within 
the economy, were output to reach inordinately high levels relative to 
the economy's size. Even though such a speculation may seem exaggera 
ted beyond reason, it should be pointed out that just ten years ago 
nobody foresaw the massive scale at which North Sea oil was 
subsequently discovered. 
An additional aspect of rapid extraction is that it tends to reduce the 
over-all rate of recovery from an oil/gas reservoir. These reservoirs have 
to be nursed carefully in order to maximize recovery, and such careful 
nursing may not be compatible with policies of rapid extraction. Many 
Middle East oilfields have been abandoned with large potential reserves 
left untapped because the associated gas, which should have been 
reinjected to maintain pressure, was simply flared off. With oil prices 
much higher nowadays, the oil companies are much more careful of 
maximizing recovery, but it is still possible to visualize situations where 
fields might be abandoned because the extra costs involved in further 
extraction (e.g. pumping reduce profitability below ac300table levels, 
although from a national point of view further extraction might be 
desirable. 
A further  and more sinister  negative aspect of the international 
oil companies is their notorious political machinations, which have been 
20 
well documented. Normally, these companies are content to act as a 
powerful pressure group, even in the most pretentious of democracies: 
as the Los Angeles Times wrote in 1973: 'The oil industry still boasts 
more lobbyists, better Washington contacts, more 600ey for adver 
tising and bigger political campaign donations than any other 
segment of the business world'. 16 But where things are not going their 
way, the oil companies are not averse to helping bring about changes of 
government, as, for instance, in Iran in 1954, Indonesia in 1966, and 
Greece in 1967.17 An important dimension of this aspect of oil 
company activities is the ability to get their home governments to exert 
pressure on other, problematic, governments as required. Jack 
Anderson, the Washington correspondent, remarked on this in 1967: 
'The State Department has often taken its policies right out of the 
executive suites of the oil companies. When Big Oil cannot get what it 
wants in foreign countries, the State Department tries to get it for 
them."8 
DISCUSSION 
Given these various caveats, we may wish to question whether the 
international oil companies should be entrusted with the development 
of Ireland's hydrocarbon resources. Such a question is purely academic, 
as these companies already have been, and will continue to be, so 
entrusted. It may be argued that, in the licences issued to these 
companies, safeguards and controls have been inserted to ensure that 
their activities coincide with the best national interest. However, such 
control may not be easy to implement, not only because of problems 
such as concealment of information, but also because of the powerful 
pressures the companies are able to exert, as previously referred to. The 
former Minister for Industry and Commerce, Justin Keating, himself 
publicly acknowledged (at a Labour Party Conference some years ago 
the great powers wielded by these companies. 
In addition to this, it is a final argument of this paper that the 
interests of governments and oil companies may in fact coincide, in 
cases where both are simultaneously contrary to the best interests of 
the country generally. This is a possibility which, in time, should be a 
matter of great national concern. This possibility arises from the nature 
of the political process as it is practised in Ireland, which puts great 
pressure on governments to distribute largess in the short term, i.e. 
between general elections, if their survival is to be guaranteed. The 
subsequent tendency to produce short-term policies is augmented by an 
electorate which tends to compare present levels of welfare with 
previous levels, rather than hypothetical future levels. 
This situation may account, at least in part, for the extent to which 
Irish governments have come to rely in recent years on foreign invest 
ment as a source of economic growth in Ireland. Not only can multi 
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national corporations make factories available in the short term, but 
they also provide the bulk of the necessary finances themselves. The 
development of industries based on Irish resources (including not only 
hydrocarbons, but also minerals, fisheries, and agricultural resources 
on the other hand, requires a more long-term approach, and involves 
the sacrifice of immediate consumption in order to make available 
higher levels of consumption in the long term. 
In the area of oil and gas, then, there are pressures on the govern 
ment of the day to generate a flow of dividends, taxes, and royalties as 
quickly as possible. This they can do by calling in the international oil 
companies, and then granting them access to the areas of highest 
potential. It may be that the government has already licensed out too 
much of our offshore area, because if it should happen that several 
important finds were made in rapid succession, there would be no 
alternative but to allow the subsequent output to be exported in a 
crude state, given the fact that all licences guarantee a production lease 
for all finds made, and given the length of time it would take to build 
sufficient refining facilities, not to mention downstream industries. 
Norway, which had previously restricted the areas of its offshore waters 
available for hydrocarbon exploration and development, has more 
recently found it necessary to restrict further the level of output from 
fields actually developed, in what it perceived to be the national 
interest.19 Norway, however, was in a much better economic state 
before the discovery of hydrocarbon resources than Ireland now is, and 
could easily afford to take such decisions. in the Irish case, it can be 
readily seen how government policy could coincide with the interests of 
the oil companies rather than of the national economy. 
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